The well documented "Equity home bias puzzle" refers to the fact that investors tend to hold poorly diversified portfolios by favoring domestic stocks over international stocks. However, I show that even holdings of international stocks exhibit a form of home bias. I find that U.S. mutual funds invest significantly more in countries that have a strong associated ethnic group population near the funds' offices. Mutual funds that take advantage of the information generated by the local ethnic groups out-perform otherwise similar funds by more than 1.4% per quarter in their foreign holdings. This paper documents a new form of home bias, sheds light on a new information channel for foreign investment decisions, and contributes to the debate on whether mutual fund managers have skills.
This paper focuses on the demand side point of view and attempts to identify the forces that determine U.S. investors' demand for foreign stocks and their decision to invest in a particular foreign country. More specifically, this paper studies the foreign holdings of U.S. mutual funds and investigates the cross-sectional differences in the countries in which mutual funds invests and the local ethnic group population surrounding mutual fund offices. I ask whether mutual fund managers overweigh companies in foreign countries that have a strong associated ethnic group population surrounding the fund offices.
The local ethnic group population is a natural channel to consider when studying the decision of U.S. investors to invest abroad. If it is the case that the home bias puzzle is largely attributed to either information asymmetry or simple familiarity bias, or "fear of the un-known", then being surrounded by a certain ethnic group can potentially alleviate either or both of those concerns and hence could facilitate more investment in the associated countries. For example, mutual funds that are headquartered in regions with large Chinese population may hold more stocks from China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, because managers of those funds feel familiar with, or at least not apprehensive of, the foreign culture and companies. Furthermore, fund managers may be able take advantage of the information that is facilitated by the local Chinese ethnic population regarding the foreign economic condition and foreign companies, and hence are able to make informed investment decisions involving stocks from the associated countries.
Consistent with this prediction, I find that U.S. mutual funds invest significantly more in stocks headquartered in countries that have strong associated ethnic groups near the funds' offices. Funds invest 14% more in the local ethnic population's home countries than would otherwise be expected. I also show that when funds change their locations, fund managers build up their holdings in local ethnic group's associated countries' stocks within a few quarters after their location change. My findings are robust to alternative measures of "strong" local ethnic group population and to the inclusion of fund fixed effects, country fixed effects, quarterly fixed effects and country×quarter fixed effects.
Furthermore, I provide one direct channel of how the local ethnic group population can affect mutual funds' investment decision in the associated country. First I find that all else being equal, the strength of local ethnic group population can strongly predict the ethnicity of the mutual fund's manager. For example, a mutual fund located in a state with a strong Chinese ethnic population has a higher probability of also having a manager with Chinese ethnicity. I find that the mutual fund manager's ethnicity can also strongly predict the fund's overweighing in the manager's home country. Funds invest 9% more in the manager's home country than otherwise similar funds with managers not associated with the same country. However, I find that the effect of the manager's ethnicity on the holdings of stocks from the associated foreign country does not completely explain away the relation between local ethnic groups and foreign holdings from the associated countries. Conditioning on the manager's ethnicity being not being related to a foreign country, the strength of the local ethnic group population is still strongly related to the local mutual fund's holding of the related countries.
Whether preferences for home bias stocks is informed is itself an interesting empirical research question. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) and Ivković and Weisbenner (2005) find support for informed local investing. In contrast, Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker (2012b) finds that mutual fund manager's home-state investments are not informed. In the context of the documented overweighing of foreign holdings from countries with a strong associated local ethnic group population, or preferences for "homesickness" stocks, a similar question can also be raised: Is the preference for international homesickness bias stocks also informed? To be more specific, it is interesting to know whether mutual fund managers overweigh stocks from an associated country just because they feel familiar with the country's culture, products and companies, even if they have no valuable information about the companies or market condition of that country, or whether they can actually take advantage of the information generated and facilitated by the local ethnic groups and make profitable investments in those countries. It might also be the case that the local ethnic groups actually demand exposure to their home countries' market, and hence local mutual funds would rationally hold more stocks from their local clients' home country.
To answer this question, I look at the differences in performance of the international holdings for mutual funds that overweigh stocks in countries that have a strong associated local ethnic groups and otherwise similar mutual funds that either overweigh stocks in countries that do not have strong associated local ethnic groups or mutual funds that do not overweigh stocks in countries that have a strong associated local ethnic group population.
Under the familiarity hypothesis and the clientele hypothesis, we should see no performance effects if the managers have no stock picking skills, or even negative performance effects if the managers have skills, since the international portion of the portfolio is built on biased and catered stocks picking choices rather than informed decisions. Only the information hypothesis would predict positive abnormal returns from the international portion of U.S. mutual funds that overweigh countries with a strong associated local ethnic group population.
My performance analysis supports the information hypothesis. In other words, mutual funds that overweigh stocks from the local ethnic group's home country outperform otherwise similar mutual funds by 1.4% per quarter in their international holdings. Additionally, I find that the magnitude of outperformance is larger for mutual funds that overweigh stocks from emerging market countries, while there is no difference in performance between mutual funds that overweigh stocks from developed countries. This is consistent with the information story, where emerging markets exhibits a more severe information asymmetry problem and hence any information advantage that can be obtained from the local ethnic groups is more valuable for the mutual fund's foreign investment decision. I also find that the overweighing of the local ethnic's associated country results in outperformance only for actively managed mutual funds that do not have international investment objective. This is also consistent with the information story as one would naturally expect mutual funds with international objective to devote more resources to mitigate the information asymmetry problem related to foreign holdings, and hence we should see little or no differences in performance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the data and variable construction. Section II considers the relation between the local ethnic group population and U.S. mutual funds foreign holdings. Section III focuses on the ethnicity of the fund's manager. Section IV studies the performance of the homesickness bias investment.
Finally, Section V concludes.
I Data and Variables Contruction
The two main dataset utilized in this paper is mutual fund holdings and state-level U.S. and other important data. The advantage of the ACS's ethnicity data compared to the decennial census is that the classification of ethnicity is much more detailed. Table I presents the link between ACS's ethnic group definition and the associated countries of origin.
[Insert Table I I remove funds that have missing values for assets and funds that have total asset less then $5 million or that hold less than 5 stocks. I keep mutual funds that are actively managed, indicated by their investment objective as "international", "aggressive growth", "growth" or "growth and income" 5 . For U.S. mutual funds, I remove holdings of foreign companies that are domiciled in the following countries, as companies located in these countries are largely attributed for their status as tax havens: Bermuda, Bahamas, British Guiana, British
Honduras, British Virgin Islands, Barbados, Cayman Islands, Channel Islands and Cyprus.
I also drop holdings that are larger than the fund's total assets, because they are clearly data errors. II Local ethnic groups and fund's foreign holdings.
I begin the empirical analysis by examining the relation between the local ethnic population and the total amount of holdings in the corresponding country by U.S. mutual funds. The main dependent variable of interest in this paper is a fund's "country holdings", which is the total holdings of stocks from a country divided by the fund's total assets. I regress funds' country holdings on two different measures of local ethnic population using various specifications. The regression framework is as follows:
where CountryHoldings i,c,t is fund i's total holdings of country c during quarter t. The first measure for the strength of the local ethnic group population, EthnicRatio Smaller and younger funds and shorter termed managers seem to exhibit more bias in their foreign holdings. What is more interesting is that the homesickness bias seems to concentrate more in emerging markets than in developed markets. Information asymmetry is presumably more severe in emerging markets, and hence the finding that overweighing in local ethnicity's home countries is stronger for emerging markets suggests that the biased trade may be informed. I will test this hypothesis in the later section of the paper.
[Insert Table VI CountryHoldings for 6 quarters before the location change on the fund's new EthnicRatio (or the EthnicRatio after the change). In column (2), I regress the fund's CountryHoldings for 6 quarters after the location change on the fund's EthnicRatio in the new location. As predicted, the mutual fund's foreign holdings before the location change are not related to the strength of the local ethnic population in the new location, but become significant after the location change. The evidences suggest that mutual funds start to overweigh the local ethnic group's home country's stocks in the 6 quarters after they move to the new state.
[Insert Table VII here] B Local Ethnic Groups, Tax Rate and Foreign Holdings.
The mutual fund location change analysis fortifies the idea that the local ethnic group populations have a significant effect on U.S. mutual funds' foreign investment. I also show that the effect is stronger for ethnic groups that are associated with emerging market countries, which suggests that mutual funds trade more stocks from the local ethnic's associated countries because of information advantage. If the local ethnic groups can facilitate information flow from their home countries into mutual funds' investment decisions, then the local information advantage should be more useful and more utilized for countries that are easier for U.S. investor's to invest in. In other words, we should see a stronger relation between the local ethnic group populations and mutual funds' foreign holdings in countries with a lower withholding tax rates on dividends paid to foreigners. to foreigners is obtained from Mishra and Ratti (2012) . The analysis is similar to that in Table V [Insert Table VIII here] III Local Ethnic Ratio and Mutual Fund Manager's Ethnicity.
The previous section establishes the relation between the local ethnic group populations and the foreign holdings of U.S. mutual funds. In other words, I find that mutual funds overweigh stocks in foreign countries that have a strong associated local ethnic group surrounding the fund offices. This this section, I establish a direct channel through which the local ethnicity can influence mutual funds' international investment decisions. There may be multiple channels that can facilitate valuable information transfer regarding investment opportunities in foreign countries, namely the banking channel and the labor channel. In this paper, I concentrate on the labor channel, specifically focusing on the ethnicity of the mutual fund managers. I hypothesize that if the labor market for mutual fund managers is geographically segmented and therefore funds are more likely to hire local managers, then mutual funds located near a strong ethnic group population are also more likely to hire managers of that same ethnicity. If this is the case, mutual funds having managers that are of the same ethnicity as the majority local ethnic groups can help catalyze the information flow from the local ethnic groups and the foreign countries into mutual funds' investment decision. As a result, a mutual fund manager's ethnicity should also be able to predict the fund's foreign holdings in the associated countries. 
where CountryHoldings i,c,t , EthnicRatio k c and M anager i,c are as previously defined.
Columns (1) and (2) include fund fixed effects, country fixed effects and quarter fixed effects. Column (3) and (4) include fund fixed effects and country×quarter fixed effects. The ethnicity of the managers can strongly predict mutual funds' holdings in the associated country. A manager with ethnicity associated with country c holds 9% more assets from country c than on average.
[Insert Table X here] I find that both the manager's ethnicity and the strength of the local ethnic population can strongly predict the mutual fund's holdings in the associated countries. Both variables are statistically significant and economically meaningful when including them in the same regression. Table XI shows the effect of the local ethnic population ratio on mutual fund's holdings of international stocks, conditioning on the manager not being of the same ethnicity. The strength of the local ethnic population can still predict the mutual fund's foreign holdings, suggesting that local ethnic groups affect mutual funds' holdings beyond what can be explained by the labor channel.
[Insert Table XI here] IV Ethnic Holdings and Performance of Foreign Holdings.
The result presented so far shows that U.S. mutual funds invest significantly more in foreign stocks from countries that have a strong representative ethnic population around the funds'
headquarters. In this section, I test whether this relation is due to superior information advantage, familiarity, or catering to the local ethnic population.
If mutual funds invest in a foreign country because of a comparative advantage they have in gathering information from the local ethnic group populations, then the international holdings of the fund's portfolio should outperform the benchmark and otherwise similar funds that have the same location, but do not take advantage of the same information from the local ethnic groups. However, if mutual funds simply invest more in countries with a strong representative local ethnic because of familiarity or or because they want to cater to those ethnic groups, we should see no differences or even lower performance in their international holdings.
To compare the international performance of mutual funds that take advantage of the information generated by the local ethnic population and mutual funds that do not, I define a variable called EthnicHold, which is the total holdings of countries with a strong local representative ethnic group population scaled by the fund's total assets. A local representative ethnic population is considered strong if the local ethnic population ratio EthnicRatio 1 c is larger than the median of that ethnic population ratio in the U.S. I then perform a Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression test by regressing the fund's quarterly international-holding returns on the lagged EthnicHold:
where Controls include fund's size and the fund's previous quarterly internationalholding return. All regression specifications include the fund's objective fixed-effects and state fixed-effects.
Column (1) of (2) and column (3). All of the predictability comes from actively managed mutual funds that do not have an international objective. This is consistent with the information hypothesis, as one would naturally expect mutual funds with international objective to concentrate more internationally and devote more resources to mitigating the information asymmetry problem related to foreign holdings. Therefore, we should see little or no differences in performance for funds with international objective.
[Insert Table XII Table II. Columns (4), (5) and (6) To better examine the magnitude of the differences in international-holding performance between funds that take advantage of the information generated by the local ethnic population and funds that do not, I sort funds into quintile portfolios based on their EthnicHold.
At the beginning of each quarter, I rank mutual funds into ascending order based on their [Insert Table XIII here] Sorting funds in Table XIII on lagged ethnic holdings yields large differences in subsequent quarterly international-holding returns. The average quarterly global-CAPM alpha of the quintile portfolios sorted by ethnic holdings increases monotonically, from 0.012 in the lowest quintile to 0.028 in the highest quintile. Column (6) (High-Low) in Table XIII All of the predictability comes from actively managed mutual funds that do not have an international objective. {Some explanation why this might be the case}.
[Insert Table XIV here] Columns (4), (5) and (6) present the results on the predictability of ethnic holdings of emerging market and developed markets. All of the predictability in international-holding returns comes from ethnic holdings in emerging markets and there is no predictability from ethnic holdings in developed markets.
V Conclusion
This paper studies the foreign holdings of U.S. mutual funds and investigates the crosssectional differences in the countries in which mutual funds invests and the local ethnic group population surrounding mutual fund offices. I find that U.S. mutual funds invest significantly more in stocks headquartered in countries that have strong associated ethnic groups near the funds' offices. Funds invest 14% more in the local ethnic population's home countries than would otherwise be expected.
I find evidence that mutual funds's preference for the foreign homesickness bias stocks is informed. Mutual funds that overweigh stocks from the local ethnic groups' home country outperform otherwise similar mutual funds by 1.4% per quarter in their international holdings. I also find that the overweighing of the local ethnic's associated country results in outperformance only for actively managed mutual funds that do not have international investment objective. Furthermore, the outperformance is larger for informed investments made in emerging market countries.
The contribution of this paper goes beyond documenting a new form of home bias that also exists in U.S. investor's foreign holdings. I shed light on a new information channel for foreign investment decisions of professional investors, namely the information generated by the local ethnic group population. This information channel may not be limited to the decision of mutual fund managers, but can be expanded to other form of international investment as well, such as the decision of U.S. multination corporation to invest in a foreign country 7 . Given that foreign investment has increased so dramatically over time, this information channel will become more and more important. InterStocks is the number of international stocks held by a mutual fund. CountryHoldings i,c,t is fund i's total holdings of country c during quarter t, divided by fund i's total assets. EthnicRatio 1 c,t is the total population of an ethnic group associated with country c in the state fund i is located divided by the total population of that state. EthnicRatio 2 c,t is the total population of an ethnic group associated with country c in the state fund i is located divided by the total population of that ethnic group in the U.S. EthnicHold is a fund's total holdings of countries with a strong local representative ethnic population scaled by the fund's total assets. A local representative ethnic population is considered strong if the local ethnic population ratio is larger than the median of that ethnic population ratio in the U.S. EthnicHold Emerging and EthnicHold Developed are the fund's total holdings of emerging countries and developed countries, respectively, that have strong local representative ethnic populations. This Table reports the relation between the local ethnic group population and the foreign holdings of U.S. actively managed mutual funds. CountryHoldings i,c,t is fund i's total holdings of country c during quarter t, divided by fund i's total assets. EthnicRatio 1 c,t−1 is the total population of an ethnic group associated with country c in the state fund i is located divided by the total population of that state. EthnicRatio 2 c,t−1 is the total population of an ethnic group associated with country c in the state fund i is located divided by the total population of that ethnic group in the U.S. Columns (1), (3) and (5) include fund, country and quarter fixed effects, and columns (2), (4) and (6) include fund and country×quarter fixed effects. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors that are clustered at the quarterly level. * * * , * * and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. This Table reports the relation between the local ethnic group population and the foreign holdings of U.S. actively managed mutual funds, for various subsamples. CountryHoldings i,c,t is fund i's total holdings of country c during quarter t, divided by fund i's total assets. EthnicRatio 1 c,t−1 is the total population of an ethnic group associated with country c in the state fund i is located divided by the total population of that state. All regressions include fund, country and quarter fixed effects. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors that are clustered at the quarterly level. * * * , * * and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
(8) This Table reports the relation between the local ethnic group population and the foreign holdings of U.S. actively managed mutual funds, including the interaction of the local ethnic group population ratio with the dividend tax withheld rates on dividend payment to U.S. investors for different countries. CountryHoldings i,c,t is fund i's total holdings of country c during quarter t, divided by the fund i's total assets. EthnicRatio 1 c,t−1 is the total population of an ethnic group associated with country c in the state fund i is located divided by the total population of that state. EthnicRatio 2 c,t−1 is the total population of an ethnic group associated with country c in the state fund i is located divided by the total population of that ethnic group in the U.S. T ax is the dividend tax withheld rates on dividend payment to foreigners (or U.S. investor) for each country. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors that are clustered at the quarterly level. * * * , * * and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. This table reports the relation between the local ethnic group population and the ethnicity of U.S. actively managed mutual fund managers. M anager i,c is an indicator variable and takes the value of one if the manager of fund i has the ethnicity associated with country c. EthnicRatio 1 c,t−1 is the total population of an ethnic group associated with country c in the state fund i is located divided by the total population of that state. EthnicRatio 2 c,t−1 is the total population of an ethnic group associated with country c in the state fund i is located divided by the total population of that ethnic group in the U.S. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors that are clustered at the quarterly level. * * * , * * and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. This table reports the relation between the ethnicity of U.S. actively managed mutual fund managers and their foreign holdings. CountryHoldings i,c,t is fund i's total holdings of country c during quarter t, divided by fund i's total assets. M anager i,c is an indicator variable and takes the value of one if the manager of fund i has the ethnicity associated with country c. EthnicRatio 1 c,t−1 is the total population of an ethnic group associated with country c in the state fund i is located divided by the total population of that state. Columns (1) and (2) include fund, country and quarter fixed effects. Columns (3) and (4) include fund and country×quarter fixed effects. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors that are clustered at the quarterly level. * * * , * * and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. This table reports the relation between the ethnicity of U.S. actively managed mutual fund managers and their foreign holdings, conditioning on the manager's ethnicity not being related to the associated foreign country. CountryHoldings i,c,t is fund i's total holdings of country c during quarter t, divided by fund i's total assets. M anager i,c is an indicator variable and takes the value of one if the manager of fund i has the ethnicity associated with country c. EthnicRatio 1 c,t−1 is the total population of an ethnic group associated with country c in the state fund i is located divided by the total population of that state. EthnicRatio 2 c,t−1 is the total population of an ethnic group associated with country c in the state fund i is located divided by the total population of that ethnic group in the U.S. Columns (1), (2) and (3) include fund, country and quarter fixed effects. Columns (4), (5) and (6) (4), (5) and (6) show regression results for the entire sample. Column (2) shows the regression result for funds with international objective. Column (3) shows regression result for all actively managed mutual funds other than international objective funds. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * * * , * * and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of a fund's return on lagged "Ethnic holdings". EthnicHold is the total holdings of countries with a strong local representative ethnic population scaled by the fund's total assets. A local representative ethnic population is considered strong if the local ethnic population ratio is larger than the median of that ethnic population ratio in the U.S. EthnicHold Emerging and EthnicHold Developed are the total holdings of emerging countries and developed countries, respectively, with strong local representative ethnic populations. Ret is a fund's monthly return. Size is a fund's log assets.
Column (1), (4), (5) and (6) show regression results for the entire sample. Column (2) shows the regression result for funds with international objective. Column (3) shows the regression result for all actively managed mutual funds other than international objective funds. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * * * , * * and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. EthnicHold is the total holdings of countries with a strong local representative ethnic population scaled by the fund's total assets. A local representative ethnic population is considered as strong if the local ethnic population ratio is larger than the median of that ethnic population ratio in the U.S. EthnicHold Emerging and EthnicHold Developed are the total holdings of emerging countries and developed countries, respectively, with strong local representative ethnic populations. IdioV ol is the fund's idiosyncratic volatility and is computed from the residuals of the four-factor model using daily returns during the quarter immediately after the measurement of EthnicHold.
Size is a fund's log assets. Stock is the number of different stocks held by the fund. InterStock is the number of international stocks held by the fund. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * * * , * * and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
